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1A Secure Optimum Distributed Detection Scheme
in Under-Attack Wireless Sensor Networks
Edmond Nurellari, Des McLernon, Member, IEEE, and Mounir Ghogho, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We address the problem of centralized detection of
a binary event in the presence of β fraction falsifiable sensor
nodes (SNs) (i.e., controlled by an attacker) for a bandwidth-
constrained under− attack spatially uncorrelated distributed
wireless sensor network (WSN). The SNs send their one-bit test
statistics over orthogonal channels to the fusion center (FC),
which linearly combines them to reach to a final decision.
Adopting the modified deflection coefficient as an alternative
function to be optimized, we first derive in a closed-form the FC
optimal weights combining. But as these optimal weights require
a− priori knowledge that cannot be attained in practice, this
optimal weighted linear FC rule is not implementable. We also
derive in a closed-form the expressions for the attacker “flipping
probability” (defined in paper) and the minimum fraction of
compromised SNs that makes the FC incapable of detecting.
Next, based on the insights gained from these expressions,
we propose a novel and non-complex reliability-based strategy
to identify the compromised SNs and then adapt the weights
combining proportional to their assigned reliability metric. In
this way, the FC identifies the compromised SNs and decreases
their weights in order to reduce their contributions towards
its final decision. Finally, simulation results illustrate that the
proposed strategy significantly outperforms (in terms of FC’s
detection capability) the existing compromised SNs identification
and mitigation schemes.
Index Terms—Distributed detection, optimum fusion rule, fal-
sified sensor nodes (SNs) observations, wireless sensor networks
(WSNs).
I. INTRODUCTION
C
ENTRALIZED detection of a binary event is one of the
most important applications of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) [1], [2]. Deployed over a field, multiple coordinated
SNs report their processed observations to a fusion center
(FC). Then, upon receiving all the contributions from each
SN, the FC optimally combines them to declare a global deci-
sion. Unfortunately, these tiny devices suffer from constrained
bandwidth and limited available on-board power. Furthermore,
the geographically distributed nature of such a system makes
them quite vulnerable to a different type of attack. Hence,
incorporating security into WSNs has been a challenging task.
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Like all other networks [3], WSNs are also vulnerable to
various security issues. Furthermore, the local SNs decision
process (i.e., local detection performance) itself is subject to
various security threats. The detection performance strongly
depends on the reliability of these SNs in the network. While
fusing the data received by the spatially deployed SNs allows
making a reliable FC decision with respect to the status of the
phenomena, it is possible that one or more SNs (compromised
by an attacker) deliberately falsify their local observations to
degrade the FC detection performance. However, there are
a number of different strategies as to how the test statistics
received from each SN will be efficiently used in order to
arrive at a reliable FC final decision. We will first give a brief
review on the related work before introducing our proposed
approach.
The framework of distributed detection under attack−free
WSNs has been extensively studied in [4]-[14], to name but
just a few. While references [4]-[8] consider distributed de-
tection by assuming unlimited bandwidth/resources in WSNs,
the authors of [9]-[14] relax this assumption by consider-
ing distributed detection over bandwidth-constrained/energy-
constrained WSNs. But these approaches are vulnerable to
security attacks as some of the SNs reporting to the FC may
be compromised. As a result, the FC is not robust against such
attacks and its detection performance will be degraded.
Now, security vulnerabilities can be exploited by different
types of attacks that can be launched in a WSN, for example,
jamming, spoofing, wiretap disruption attacks, etc [15]. Apart
from these well-known traditional security threats, several re-
cent studies consider the sensor node data falsification (SNDF)
attack (known as a Byzantine attack, eg., [16], [17]). The
Byzantine attack was first proposed by [18] and later widely
used in the context of distributed detection ( [16], [19], [20]
and see references therein). In this work, we also consider the
SNDF attack in which the compromised SNs send wrong local
decision reports to the FC either to degrade the FC detection
performance or to achieve their selfish greedy objectives.
The reported work on distributed detection over attack−
freeWSNs is relatively high but there is limited consideration
for under−attack WSNs, see for example, [16]-[21] and
references therein. In [21], a probabilistic test statistic falsifi-
cation (TSF) attack is proposed and theoretical performance
evaluation (in terms of destructiveness and stealthiness) is
obtained. The authors of [22], in the context of smart grids,
propose heuristic centralized algorithms to derive various
strategies (attacker versus defender dynamics). Then, a dis-
tributed algorithm is proposed that guarantees convergence to
the centralized solution taken at the FC. Reference [23], in the
2context of cognitive radio (CR), proposed a prefiltering scheme
of sensing data and a trust factor is assigned to each user
to detect the malicious CR ones. The authors of [24], in the
context of target localization, also consider binary Byzantine
attacks where the SNs transmit to the FC their binary decisions
and they propose two techniques to mitigate the compromised
SNs negative impact on the FC decision. To mitigate the
Byzantine effect on the data fusion problem in cooperative
spectrum sensing, a weighted sequential probability ratio
test was proposed in [25]. However, these schemes require
a− priori information and/or due to the high computational
complexity are not always feasible in the context of WSNs.
In [26], a reputation-based scheme is proposed for identifying
the compromised SNs by accumulating the deviations between
each SN’s decision and the FC’s decision over a time window
duration. Then, the identified compromised SNs are totally
excluded from the data fusion process. Different from [26], the
authors in [27] use the FC’s decision as an evaluation basis to
assign to each SN a reputation measure, classifying each SN as
either reliable, partially reliable or malicious. In this way, the
SNs classified as malicious will be excluded from the fusion
process (i.e., assigned zero weight), and the one decided on
as reliable will be assigned a unity weight and the partially
reliable ones are assigned a 0.5 weight. However, identifying
and then totally excluding the compromised SNs contributions
from the FC decision process may not be the best strategy. For
instance, we might end up excluding SNs contributing towards
the FC global decision that might have high local signal-to-
noise-ratios (SNRs). Recently, the authors in [19], [28] both
consider a decentralized network in the presence of com-
promised SNs while in this paper we consider a centralized
scheme. The authors in [19] propose a synchronous distributed
weighted average consensus algorithm that is claimed to be
robust to Byzantine attacks while reference [28] considers
the detection and mitigation of data injection attacks in a
randomized average consensus.
So, this work investigates the detection performance of
an under−attack WSN. To reduce the transmission and
processing burden of the SNs, each SN generates the 1-bit
local test statistic by performing energy detection [29] and
reports this test statistic to the FC. As in [26], we relax the
assumption of perfect knowledge of the true hypothesis [16]
and we assume that the compromised SNs (controlled by the
attacker) do not know the true state of the target. For the
FC, we assume that it is not compromised and receives the
test statistic from both types of SNs (i.e., compromised and
honest). The transmission (SNs to FC) links are assumed error
free (see eg., [16], [26]).
A. Contributions & Oragnization
Our main contributions are as follows:
(i) First, we develop an efficient FC linear weight combing
framework for an under−attack WSN. To further reduce the
optimization complexity and to get an insight into the problem,
we adopt the modified deflection coefficient (MDC) [7] as
an alternative function to be optimized. Based on this (i.e.,
the MDC), we provide an optimization problem to be solved
from both the FC’s and the attacker’s perspective. From the
FC’s perspective, we derive analytically (in a closed form) the
optimal weight combiner for each SN. We show that these
weights are a function of the local SNs probability of false
alarm and probability of detection metrics as well as the SNs
local test statistics “flipping probability” (to be defined later).
Unfortunately, for the compromised SNs this a priori knowl-
edge cannot be obtained in practice (we propose a solution to
this (see later (ii))). Then (from the attacker’s perspective), we
derive analytically (for a fixed number of compromised SNs)
the optimum attacker local test statistics flipping probability
and the minimum fraction of the compromised SNs that makes
the FC incapable of detecting.
(ii) Next, based on this framework (i.e., FC linear weight
combing strategy), we also propose a new non-complex and
efficient (based on a reliability metric) FC detection scheme
to identify the compromised SNs. Our approach is different
from the existing approaches [16], [26], [27] in two important
aspects: 1) We introduce a new reliability metric at the
FC to identify the compromised SNs. First, we count the
inconsistency between the FC’s decision (where all the SNs
contributions are considered) and the ith local SN’s decision
over a time window. Similarly, we then count the inconsistency
between the FC’s decision (where the ith SN contribution is
not considered) and the ith local SN’s decision. Finally, the
proposed reputation metric is evaluated as the difference be-
tween these two parameters; 2) Then, based on this reputation
metric, we propose a novel FC weight computation strategy
that ensures the following: a) for the identified compromised
SNs, their weights are likely to be decreased proportionally to
this metric (where the existing schemes assign a zero weight).
b) In this way (based on this new reputation metric), the
FC decides how much a SN should contribute to its final
decision. We will show that this strategy outperforms the
existing schemes where the identified compromised SNs are
totally excluded from the FC final decision contribution (i.e.,
a zero weight is assigned).
Now, the summary of the paper is as follows. In Section II
we describe the system model (SN sensing and local decision)
and describe the compromised SNs attack model. Section
III introduces the simplified linear weighted fusion rule and
analyzes the optimization problem from both the FC’s and the
attacker’s perspective. In Section IV we present our proposed
compromised SNs identification metric and weight combining
computation strategy. Finally, section V presents simulation
results and in Section VI we give our conclusions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the problem of detecting the presence of an
unknown but deterministic signal s(n) by an under− attack
WSN consisting of M geographically distributed SNs and
a FC (see Fig. 1). The honest SNs are represented with a
black color and the compromised SNs (i.e., the ones controlled
by the attacker) with a red color. The attacker’s aim is
to successfully manipulate the FC global decision making
process while the FC would like to detect reliably (i.e., with
very high probability). Next, we explain in more detail the
3sensing, the local decision and the compromised SNs attack
model.
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Fig. 1. Under attack schematic communication architecture between periph-
eral SNs and the fusion center (FC). Each of the ith honest/compromised
SNs represented with a black/red color generates a local (binary) indicator
variable (Ii/I
C
i ) by observing the target and performing the test in (5) with
local detection threshold Λ/ΛC . While the i
th (i = {1, 2, 4, 6}) honest
SN indicator (test statistic) remains unchanged (i.e., I˜i = Ii), the j
th
(j = {3, 5}) compromised SN falsifies its indicator (test statistic) as in (8)
before transmitting to the FC. Here i/j are the honest/compromised SN index.
A. Sensing
The measured signal at SN i is either:
H0 : yi (n) = wi (n) (1)
H1 : yi (n) = si (n) + wi (n) (2)
and energy estimation is performed at the ith SN to give
Ti =
N∑
n=1
(yi(n))
2
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M (3)
which for large N has an approximately Gaussian distribution
[29]. Furthermore, the noise samples are assumed to be
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) across time
and space. It is not difficult to show that
E {Ti|H0} = Nσ
2
i , Var {Ti|H0} = 2Nσ
4
i
E {Ti|H1}=Nσ
2
i (1 + ξi) ,Var {Ti|H1}=2Nσ
4
i (1+2ξi) (4)
where ξi =
N∑
n=1
s2i (n) /Nσ
2
i .
B. Local Decision
Based on its local energy estimation (3), the ith SN gener-
ates a binary indicator random variable Ii as follows:
if Ti < Λ, Ii = 0 =⇒ decide H0
if Ti ≥ Λ, Ii = 1 =⇒ decide H1
}
(5)
where Λ is a local detection threshold that is the same for all
the M SNs. The ith SN local probability of false alarm (pifa)
and the local probability of detection (pid) can be expressed
as:
pifa = Pr (Ti ≥ Λ|H0)=Q
(
Λ− E {Ti|H0}√
Var {Ti|H0}
)
pid = Pr (Ti ≥ Λ|H1) = Q
(
Λ− E {Ti|H1}√
Var {Ti|H1}
)
(6)
where Q(.) is the Q-function. While the ith honest SN
transmits its actual one-bit test statistic (i.e., Ii in (5)) to the
FC, the compromised SNs falsify them before transmitting to
the FC. Next we introduce the attacker model.
C. Compromised SNs Attack
Different attack strategies could be adopted by the compro-
mised SNs. In this work, the data falsification attack model
widely used in [16], [20], [26] is considered. There are β
fraction of SNs controlled and compromised by the attacker
(the attacker controls the local detection threshold, the flipping
probability, and the fraction β, all to be defined later). As
before, (i.e., in the case of attack − free) each of the ith
compromised SNs perform the local test in (5) but now with a
local detection threshold (ΛC) controlled by the attacker and
assumed to be the same for all the β fraction compromised
SNs. That is:
if Ti < ΛC , I
C
i = 0 =⇒ decide H0
if Ti ≥ ΛC , I
C
i = 1 =⇒ decide H1.
}
(7)
Now, the probability of false alarm1 (pi,Cfa ) and the probability
of detection (pi,Cd ) at the i
th compromised SN are respectively
given as in (6) with Λ = ΛC , while for the honest SNs
it remains as in (6). After performing the test in (7), the
compromised SNs further manipulate their binary indicator
variables prior to FC transmission so as to yield the maximum
possible FC degradation. Let P flipC be the probability that each
compromised SN intentionally reports the opposite informa-
tion to its actual local decision (i.e., flips the indicator random
variable in (7) prior to FC transmission with probability
P flipC ). It is assumed that all the compromised SNs have the
same probability of attack in a particular sensing period (see
section IV for details). The remaining (1-β fraction) SNs are
“honest” and report to the FC accordingly. Now, the ith local
binary indicator test statistic for the compromised SNs can be
expressed as:
I˜i =
{
1− ICi , with probability P
flip
C
ICi , with probability (1− P
flip
C )
(8)
while for the honest SNs this relation is simply I˜i = Ii.
Similarly, the ith compromised SN local probability of false
alarm and the probability of detection can be shown to be
1Here the superscripts “i, C” refer to the ith compromised SN.
4R =
(
1− β
)
diag


p1d
(
1− p1d
)
+ β
1−β
(
P flipC + p
1,C
d
(
1− 2P flipC
))(
1− P flipC + p
1,C
d
(
2P flipC − 1
))
p2d
(
1− p2d
)
+ β
1−β
(
P flipC + p
2,C
d
(
1− 2P flipC
))(
1− P flipC + p
2,C
d
(
2P flipC − 1
))
...
pMd
(
1− pMd
)
+ β
1−β
(
P flipC + p
M,C
d
(
1− 2P flipC
))(
1− P flipC + p
M,C
d
(
2P flipC − 1
))

 , α =


α1
α2
...
αM

 (18)
respectively:
p˜ifa = P
flip
C
(
1− pi,Cfa
)
+
(
1− P flipC
)
pi,Cfa
p˜id = P
flip
C
(
1− pi,Cd
)
+
(
1− P flipC
)
pi,Cd (9)
while for the honest SNs clearly p˜ifa = p
i
fa and p˜
i
d = p
i
d.
Next, we introduce a simplified (optimum) linear fusion rule
at the FC.
III. SIMPLIFIED FUSION RULE-THE LINEAR APPROACH
Now, the ith SN transmits to the FC the one-bit local test
statistic (I˜i). The communication channels between SNs and
the FC are assumed to be error-free in this paper. Upon receiv-
ing all the contributions from all the SNs (i.e., compromised
and honest), the FC linearly combines them:
Tf =
M∑
i=1
αiI˜i (10)
where {αi}
M
i=1 are the optimum weights that we will derive
later in section III-A. The FC then makes the final decision:
if Tf < Λf , decide H0
if Tf ≥ Λf , decide H1
}
(11)
where Λf is the FC detection threshold. Let
Pd = Pr
(
Tf ≥ Λf |H1
)
Pfa = Pr
(
Tf ≥ Λf |H0
)
(14)
where Pd and Pfa are the system probability of detection and
probability of false alarm respectively. For large M , Tf can
be approximated by a Gaussian distribution and the Pd for a
fixed Pfa is given as [30]:
Pd=Q
(
Q−1 (Pfa)
√
Var {Tf |H0}− E {Tf |H1}+E {Tf |H0}√
Var {Tf |H1}
)
(15)
with appropriate quantities given in (12)-(13).
A. Weight Combining Optimisation
In this section, we would like to find the optimum weighting
vector (αopt) that maximizes (15). However, maximizing (15)
w.r.t. α is difficult and no closed form solution can be found.
So we will approximate the optimal solution by adopting the
modified deflection coefficient2 (MDC) [7] as an alternative
function to be maximized. This is given as:
d˜2 (α) =
(
E {Tf |H1} − E {Tf |H0}√
Var {Tf |H1}
)2
=
(
bTα
)2
αTRα
(16)
where
b=


(
1− β
)(
p1d − p
1
fa
)
− β
(
p1,Cd − p
1,C
fa
)(
2P flipC − 1
)(
1− β
)(
p2d − p
2
fa
)
− β
(
p2,Cd − p
2,C
fa
)(
2P flipC − 1
)
...(
1− β
)(
pMd −p
M
fa
)
−β
(
pM,Cd − p
M,C
fa
)(
2P flipC − 1
)


(17)
andR and α are given in (18). Now, our optimization problem
is:
αopt = arg max
α
(
d˜2 (α)
)
. (19)
Further, via the transformation ψ = R1/2α, the deflection
coefficient (16) becomes:
d˜2 (ψ) =
ψTDψ
||ψ||2
, D = R−T/2bbTR−1/2. (20)
So αopt = R
−1/2ψopt = kR
−1b, where ψopt = kR
−1/2b is
the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of
D. Now, the optimum weight combining in (10) can be easily
shown to be (21). Clearly, the optimum weights depend
on the local probability of false alarm and the probability of
detection metrics as well as on the β (fraction of compromised
SNs) and the probability of flipping the local decisions by the
attacker. For the SNs that are honest (i.e., controlled by the FC)
these local probabilities are known (since the FC can set the
local detection threshold itself). However, for the compromised
SNs these local probabilities are not available at the FC (since
the attacker takes control of the local detection threshold).
To make the matters worse, the FC knows just the fraction
of compromised SNs (i.e., β) but it cannot identify who they
are. As a result, the FC cannot implement the optimum weight
combining fusion rule (10).
Later, in section IV, we propose a simple but yet effective
approach to possibly identify these compromised SNs and
compute the optimum weights at the FC, based on their
assigned reliability. Next, we derive the optimum attacker
flipping probability (P flipC ) which makes the FC incapable of
detecting.
2In order to get insight into the system design parameters of the detection
scheme, in this paper we adopt the MDC. This is due to its simplicity and
close relationship with the detection performance. In general, Pd is a mono-
tonically increasing function of the MDC and yields a good approximation in
characterizing the detection performance.
5E {Tf |H1} = (1− β)
M∑
i=1
αip
i
d + β
[
P flipC
( M∑
i=1
αi
(
1− pi,Cd
))
+
(
1− P flipC
)( M∑
i=1
αip
i,C
d
)]
E {Tf |H0} = (1− β)
M∑
i=1
αip
i
fa + β
[
P flipC
( M∑
i=1
αi
(
1− pi,Cfa
))
+
(
1− P flipC
)( M∑
i=1
αip
i,C
fa
)]
. (12)
Var {Tf |H1} = (1− β)
M∑
i=1
α2i p
i
d
(
1− pid
)
+ β
[(
P flipC
( M∑
i=1
α2i
(
1− pi,Cd
))
+
(
1− P flipC
)( M∑
i=1
α2i p
i,C
d
))
(
1− P flipC
( M∑
i=1
α2i
(
1− pi,Cd
))
−
(
1− P flipC
)( M∑
i=1
α2i p
i,C
d
))]
Var {Tf |H0} = (1− β)
M∑
i=1
α2i p
i
fa
(
1− pifa
)
+ β
[(
P flipC
( M∑
i=1
α2i
(
1− pi,Cfa
))
+
(
1− P flipC
)( M∑
i=1
α2i p
i,C
fa
))
(
1− P flipC
( M∑
i=1
α2i
(
1− pi,Cfa
))
−
(
1− P flipC
)( M∑
i=1
α2i p
i,C
fa
))]
. (13)
αiopt =
(
1− β
)(
pid − p
i
fa
)
+ β
(
pi,Cfa − p
i,C
d
)(
2P flipC − 1
)
(
1− β
)(
pid
(
1− pid
))
+ β
(
P flipC + p
i,C
d
(
1− 2P flipC
))(
1− P flipC + p
i,C
d
(
2P flipC − 1
)) . (21)
B. Attacker Flipping Probability Optimisation
So what is the optimum P flipC that the attacker needs to
adopt for the compromised SNs in order to cause the maximum
possible degradation to the FC (i.e., to possibly make the FC
incapable of detecting)? Again, we use the modified deflection
coefficient as an alternative function to be optimized and
assume that the FC does not act strategically against the
attacker strategy.
Lemma 1: The optimum flipping probability
(
P flipC,opt
)
which
minimizes the modified deflection coefficient is:
P flipC,opt =
β − 1
2β
( M∑
i=1
αi
(
pid − p
i
fa
)
M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cfa − p
i,C
d
)
)
+
1
2
. (22)
Proof. Since the modified deflection coefficient is always non-
negative, then its minimum is always greater than or equal to
zero. So, the condition to make the minimum of the modified
deflection coefficient zero is:
bTα =
(
1−β
) M∑
i=1
αi
(
pid−p
i
fa
)
+βP flipC
M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cfa −p
i,C
d
)
+ β
(
1− P flipC
) M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cd − p
i,C
fa
)
= 0. (23)
Further simplification of the above and re-arrangement of the
terms yields:
β
( M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cfa −p
i,C
d
))(
2P flipC −1
)
=
(
β−1
) M∑
i=1
αi
(
pid−p
i
fa
)
=⇒ P flipC,opt =
β − 1
2β
( M∑
i=1
αi
(
pid − p
i
fa
)
M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cfa − p
i,C
d
)
)
+
1
2
. (24)
This concludes the proof. 
In the special case when the attacker does not change
the local detection threshold in (7) (i.e., pid = p
i,C
d and
pifa = p
i,C
fa ), then the optimum probability of flipping the
local decisions can be shown to be:
P flipC,opt =


1
2
−
β − 1
2β
=
1
2β
, for 0.5 ≤ β ≤ 1
not applicable, for β = 0
not defined, otherwise.
(25)
Interestingly, in this case the optimum probability of flipping
the local SNs decision is inversely proportional to the fraction
of the compromised SNs (β). As expected, when β increases,
the optimum probability of flipping the local decision in order
to make the MDC zero decreases and vice-versa. Furthermore,
when the half of the network is compromised (i.e., β = 0.5),
the attacker can make the modified deflection coefficient zero
with P flipC,opt = 1 (i.e., the local SNs should always flip their
local decisions).
6C. Minimum Fraction of Compromised SNs
Now, we are interesting in the minimum fraction of the
compromised SNs that is needed to cause the maximum
possible degradation to the FC. We state the result in the next
Lemma.
Lemma 2: The minimum fraction of the compromised SNs
needed to make the FC incapable of detecting or to make the
modified deflection coefficient zero is βmin ≥
1
2
.
Proof. As we previously stated, the modified deflection co-
efficient is always non-negative and the minimum occurs at
zero. From (23), the condition to make the modified deflection
coefficient zero is:
bTα =
(
1−β
) M∑
i=1
αi
(
pid−p
i
fa
)
+βP flipC
M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cfa −p
i,C
d
)
+ β
(
1− P flipC
) M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cd − p
i,C
fa
)
= 0. (26)
After simplifying the above equation, the condition on β
needed to make the FC incapable of detecting becomes:
β =


1−
( ( M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cd − p
i,C
fa
))(
1− 2P flipC
)
M∑
i=1
αi
(
pid − p
i
fa
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
)


−1
.
(27)
Now, the minimum of β (βmin) can be achieved when term
(A) of (27) is minimum. We also know that for any real scalar
a and b the following holds:
min
(a
b
)
≥
min
(
a
)
max
(
b
) . (28)
Using (27) and (28), we now derive a lower bound on the
minimum β. Clearly, we require that both the numerator
and the denominator of term (A) take the minimum and
the maximum values respectively. Now, the minimum of the
numerator (i.e., min
(( M∑
i=1
αi
(
pi,Cd − p
i,C
fa
))(
1 − 2P flipC
))
)
can be achieved if both pi,Cd = P
flip
C = 0 and p
i,C
fa = 1
or alternatively when both pi,Cd = P
flip
C = 1 and p
i,C
fa = 0.
Similarly, the maximum of the denominator of term (A) (i.e.,
max
(
M∑
i=1
αi
(
pid− p
i
fa
))
) can be achieved when both pid = 1
and pifa = 0. Finally, using the above analysis we can easily
show that:
βmin ≥
1
2
. (29)
This concludes the proof. 
In the special case when the attacker does not change the
local detection threshold in (7) (i.e., pid = p
i,C
d and p
i
fa =
pi,Cfa ), the minimum fraction of compromised SNs required to
make the modified deflection coefficient zero (i.e., make the
FC incapable of detecting) can be shown to be: βmin =
1
2
and
this can be achieved with P flipC = 1 (see (25)).
IV. COMPROMISED SNS IDENTIFICATION AND WEIGHT
COMBINING COMPUTATION
In this section, we propose a scheme to identify the compro-
mised SNs and compute the weight combining in (10) based
on each SN assigned reliability. As in [26] and [27], we divide
the local sensing process into time windows consisting of K
sensing periods3.
A. Compromised SNs Identification
At the fusion center, the received observations corre-
sponding to the ith SNs can be expressed as I˜i =
[I˜i(1), I˜i(2), · · · , I˜i(K)], ∀i = 1, 2, · · · ,M . At the l
th sensing
period, upon receiving the contributions from all the SNs (i.e.,
compromised and honest) the FC linearly combines them to
yield:
Tf (l) =
M∑
j=1
αAFj I˜j(l), l = 1, 2, · · · ,K
T if (l) =
M∑
j=1,i 6=j
αAFj I˜j(l), l = 1, 2, · · · ,K, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M
(30)
where T if (l) is the final test statistic at the l
th sensing period
without the contribution of the ith SN; and {αAFj }
M
j=1 are
the optimum weights under an attack-free scenario and can be
easily derived from (21) by substituting (β = 0, P flipC = 0,
pi,Cfa = p
i
fa and p
i,C
d = p
i
d, ∀i). These can be shown to be:
αAFj =
pjd − p
j
fa
pjd
(
1− pjd
) . (31)
Based on the test statistics (30), the FC then generates at the
lth sensing period two different indicator random variables as
follows:
If (l) =
{
0 if Tf (l) < Λf
1 if Tf (l) ≥ Λf
Iif (l) =
{
0 if T if (l) < Λf
1 if T if (l) ≥ Λf .
(32)
Now that the FC has evaluated these two indicator random
variables (i.e., If (l) and I
i
f (l)), it then compares them to the
ith SN local indicator variable I˜i(l) to yield:
di(l) =
{
1 if If (l) 6= I˜i(l)
0 otherwise
dˆi(l) =
{
1 if Iif (l) 6= I˜i(l)
0 otherwise
(33)
where di(l) represents the inconsistency between the FC’s
decision (all the SNs contributions are counted) and the ith
SN local decision. Similarly, dˆi(l) represents the same but
now the ith SN is not considered at the FC decision. Note
that all of the above steps are performed during the same time
3Each SN samples N times (see (3)) in each sensing interval and then
performs the energy detection as in (5).
7window K. After observing the reports for up to K sensing
periods, the FC evaluates a reliability metric for the ith SN:
ri =
1
K
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
l=1
(
di(l)− dˆi(l)
)∣∣∣∣∣ , i = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (34)
It is worth mentioning that the ri’s for the compromised SNs
are expected to be larger than those for the honest ones (see
simulations results section later). Finally, the FC performs the
reliability test:
if ri < δ, decide reliable
if ri ≥ δ, decide not reliable
}
(35)
where δ is the reliability detection threshold. Now, the prob-
ability that a compromised SN has been truly detected and
the probability that an honest SN has been falsely detected
at the ith SN are respectively:
P i,trued = Pr
(
ri ≥ δ|Compromised
)
P i,falsed = Pr
(
ri ≥ δ|Honest
)
(36)
where the superscript “i, true” and “i, false” represents the
true and false detection at the ith SN respectively. Obviously,
the compromised SNs detection performance depends on the
choice of the reliability detection threshold (δ). If we choose
a large δ, P i,falsed is expected to be low. However, this also
will result in a low P i,trued . On the other hand, choosing a
lower δ it will increase the P i,trued value but also an increase
in P i,falsed will be noticed. Clearly, the reliability detection
threshold imposes a trade-off between these two metrics. Note
that in practice we wish to keep P i,falsed close to zero and
P i,trued close to one. Based on this reliability test (i.e., the
test in (35)), next we will evaluate the weight combining in
(10) such that the probability of detection in (15) is further
improved.
B. Proposed Weight Combining Computation
In this section, we propose a weight combining computa-
tion based on the reliability test (35). Existing schemes use
reliability-based metrics to possibly identify the compromised
SNs and then totally exclude them from contributing to the FC
process and decision. However, identifying and then excluding
them from the detection process is not the optimum solution.
For instance, we might end up removing (from contributing
towards the global decision) compromised SNs that hold useful
information in general (for example those SNs with high
local SNRs). Different from the existing approaches, here we
propose to update the weight combining (i.e., (31)) of each
SN based on the correctness of information reported to the
FC. That is:
αAFi =
{
αAFi if ri < δ
αAFi − µri if ri ≥ δ
(37)
where µ ∈ [0,∞] is the weight penalty that is the same for
all the M SNs. For those SNs that are identified as being
compromised by the attacker, the FC is likely to decrease
their weights. For example, those SNs that are identified as
influential and unreliable (i.e., ri turn out to be relatively
large) the FC decreases the current weights the most. However,
for those SNs that are identified as compromised but not so
influential to the FC decision process (i.e., ri is relatively
small) the FC decreases the weights proportional to ri. With
regard to SNs identified as honest, the FC keeps their weights
unchanged. In this way, the FC decides through the weight
combiner how much a local report should contribute to the
FC final decision. This is a reasonable approach since if the
report from a SN tends to be incorrect, it should be counted
less in the final decision.
Next, in the simulation results, we will show that the
reliability detection threshold (δ) and the weight penalty (µ)
are crucial for the system detection performance. We will also
show via simulations that there is an optimum δ and µ such
that the system detection performance is maximized.
V. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
Here we will evaluate numerically the performance of our
proposed strategy and compare it to the attack−free scheme
[12] and the strategy in [26]. A WSN with a total of M = 40
SNs is considered (where a β fraction of these SNs are
compromised by the attacker). For β = 0.5, β = 0.25,
and β = 0.1, (SN21-SN40), (SN31-SN40), and (SN37-SN40)
are respectively compromised. We let all the σ2i = 0.1,
such that ξa = 10 log10
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
ξi
)
= -10.5 dB with an
arbitrarily chosen s(n) = [s1(n), s2(n), · · · , sM (n)] =[0.1,
0.175, 0.065, 0.027, 0.024, 0.026, 0.06, 0.09, 0.153, 0.11,
0.22, 0.12, 0.1, 0.024, 0.019, 0.05, 0.12, 0.1, 0.023, 0.021,
0.1, 0.175, 0.18, 0.027, 0.024, 0.026, 0.06, 0.09, 0.1, 0.065,
0.1, 0.175, 0.027, 0.024, 0.18, 0.026, 0.2, 0.09, 0.1, 0.18]T ,
and where ξi=
N∑
n=1
s2i (n)/Nσ
2
i . We will also refer to “equal
weight” combining in (10) ( i.e., αi = 1, ∀i) and use this as
a benchmark. Finally, we use 105 Monte-Carlo simulations
and choose a fixed (equal) local SNs threshold (Λ) in (5)
and local SNs threshold (ΛC) in (7) (i.e., more specifically,
Λ = ΛC = 2.6) such that P¯
false
d ≤ 0.6 (see Fig. 5-Fig. 7).
A. Impact of the time window length (K) on the malicious SN
detection accuracy and on the system detection performance
In this section, we investigate the impact that the time
window length (K) has on the compromised SNs identification
accuracy of the proposed scheme. More precisely, we are
interested in examining the two metrics, P i,trued and P
i,false
d
(see (36)). Next, we examine the impact that this time window
length (K) has on the system detection performance. More
precisely, we will examine the two metrics Pd and Pfa (see
(14)). Note that K affects these two metrics through the
reliability metric ri (see Fig. 2) in (34) which consequently
affects the FC weight combining (37) that finally decides on
the FC final test statistic (Tf ) (see (10)).
In Fig. 2 we plot the reliability metric (ri) against the FC
detection threshold (Λf ) for the compromised and the honest
SNs. As expected, for the compromised but influential SNs
(i.e., SNs with the high local SNRs), the corresponding relia-
bility metrics will be higher. In contrast, for the compromised
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Fig. 2. The reliability metric (ri) versus the FC detection threshold (Λf )
parametrized on the SNs with M = 40, N = 20, β = 0.5, P flip
C
= 1 and
K = 150.
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Fig. 3. Probability that the (compromised) SN 37 has been truly detected
(P 37,true
d
) versus the FC detection threshold (Λf ), parametrized on K, with
M = 40, N = 20, β = 0.5, P flip
C
= 1 and δ = 0.009.
or honest SNs but less influential (i.e., SNs with low SNRs),
the corresponding reliability metrics with be lower.
In Fig. 3 we plot the probability of compromised SN’s
detection4 (i.e., truly detecting probability) (P i,trued ) versus
Λf , parametrized for different time window lengths (K).
Clearly, as K increases, the detection accuracy (of the (com-
promised) SN 37) P 37,trued improves. In Fig. 4, we now plot
the probability of honest SN’s mis−detection4 (i.e., falsely
detecting probability) (P i,falsed ) (see (36)) versus (like before)
Λf for different time window lengths (K). Similarly (as in
Fig. 3), we observe that the mis − detection performance
(of the (honest) SN 11) P 11,falsed increases with K. Now,
from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 we conclude that increasing the time
window length K not only improves the detection accuracy
of the compromised SNs but at the same time increases (the
undesired)mis−detection probability of the honest SNs. This
4SN 37 (Fig. 3) and SN 11 (Fig. 4) were chosen for comparison purposes
as they possess the best and the worst performances among F and (M −F )
SNs for each case respectively. Here F and (M − F ) represents the number
of compromised and honest SNs’ respectively.
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Fig. 4. Probability that the (honest) SN 11 has been falsely detected
(P 11,false
d
) versus the FC detection threshold (Λf ), parametrized on K,
with M = 40, N = 20, β = 0.5, P flip
C
= 1 and δ = 0.009.
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Fig. 5. Average probabilities: (left) of compromised SNs detection; (right)
of honest SNs mis-detection versus the FC detection threshold (Λf ),
parametrized on K, with M = 40, N = 20, β = 0.5, P flip
C
= 1 and
δ = 0.009.
leads to a trade-off (while selecting the K parameter) between
the compromised SNs detection accuracy and the honest SNs
mis− detection performance. Note that in practice we wish
to keep P i,trued high and P
i,false
d low.
To give more generality to the results, in Fig. 5 we plot
the average5 performances (where the average is taken over
the number of compromised/honest SNs). (left) We observe
that while increasing K (more specifically from K = 40 to
K = 150) we see an improvement in the average detection
accuracy of compromised SNs. For larger K (e.g., K = 300)
this improvement is negligible; (right) The same trend is
observed for the average mis− detection performance of the
honest SNs.
In Fig. 6 we plot P¯ i,trued and P¯
false
d versus the time window
length (K) for a different FC detection thresholds (Λf ). We
can observe that the average compromised SNs detection
5The average performances are defined respectively as: P¯ true
d
=
1
F
∑
i∈J
P i,true
d
and P¯ false
d
= 1
M−F
∑
i∈Jˆ
P i,false
d
, where J (Jˆ) represents
the compromised (honest) SNs set with cardinality F ([M−F ]) respectively.
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Fig. 7. Average compromised SNs detection probability and honest SNs mis-
detection probability versus the time window length (K), parametrized on β
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performance (P¯ i,trued ) improves with the time window length
(K) for both schemes (i.e., the proposed one in this paper
and the scheme proposed in [26]). Similar behavior can be
observed for the (undesired) honest SNs mis − detection
probability. We also can observe that our proposed detection
scheme outperforms the scheme proposed in [26] (or at
least for the simulation setup considered in this paper), ∀K
in terms of P¯ i,trued − P¯
false
d quantity (e.g., for Λf = 7,
P¯ i,trued − P¯
false
d ≤ 0, ∀K for the scheme proposed in [26]).
We note that in practice we would like to have P¯ i,trued close
to 1 and P¯ falsed close to 0 (i.e., P¯
i,true
d − P¯
false
d close to 1).
In Fig. 7 we plot the same (i.e., P¯ i,trued and P¯
false
d perfor-
mances) but now parametrized on the fraction of compromised
SNs (β). Clearly, the quantity P¯ i,trued −P¯
false
d improves when
the fraction of compromised SNs (β) decreases. This behavior
(as expected) results in a robust compromised SNs detection
scheme.
Now, to give more validity to the results, in Fig. 8 we show
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Fig. 8. The Pd−Pfa metric versus the time window length (K), parametrized
on the FC detection threshold (Λf ), with M = 40, N = 20, β = 0.25,
P flip
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= 1, δ = 0.95 and µ = 0.5.
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Fig. 9. Probability of detection (false alarm) Pd (Pfa) versus the time window
length (K), parametrized on the FC detection threshold (Λf ), with M = 40,
N = 20, β = 0.25, P flip
C
= 1, δ = 0.95 and µ = 0.5.
the difference between the system detection and the system
false alarm probability (Pd − Pfa) versus the time window
length (K) parametrized on the FC detection threshold (Λf ).
Clearly, as K increases, the performance of the Pd − Pfa
metric improves for all the presented cases. Also, we can ob-
serve that our proposed scheme outperforms the one proposed
in [26]. For example, targeting a rate of 0.16, the proposed
scheme requires roughly a time window of length 5 while
the scheme in [26] requires a time window of length 11.
Then, to better understand how these two important metrics
(i.e., Pd and Pfa) evolve with K, in Fig. 9 we show both
the system detection probability (Pd) and the system false
alarm probability (Pfa) versus the time window length (K)
parametrized on the FC detection threshold (Λf ). As expected,
the larger is the time window lengthK, the better the detection
performance. However, increasing K, results in an increase in
the Pfa metric. Hence, while selecting K, one has to consider
the allowable system false alarm probability.
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In Fig. 10 and in Fig. 11, we show the same (as in
Fig. 8 and in Fig. 9 respectively) but now for (the attacker
flipping probability) P flipC = 0.2 (see (8)). As expected, the
Pd − Pfa metric improves up to K = 4 whereas after that
(i.e., for K ≥ 4) a performance saturation gain is observed.
We also note that the time window length (K∗) where this
performance saturation gain is observed increases with the
attacker flipping probability (P flipC ) (see Fig. 8-Fig. 11). This
is as expected, because increasing the (attacking) flipping
probability one would require a larger time window length (K)
for the FC in order to reduce as much as possible the attacker
influence. However, increasing the value of K may introduce
a delay to the FC detection algorithm. As a result, a careful
choice for K should be selected in practice. Nevertheless, our
proposed algorithm clearly requires a short time window span
to converge.
B. Impact of reliability detection threshold and weight penalty
parameter on the system detection performance
As previously mentioned, the reliability detection threshold
and the weight penalty (i.e., δ and µ) (see (37)) are the two
important parameters that will significantly affect the system
detection performance at the FC.
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So, in Fig. 12 we plot the ROC performance for different
choices of the reliability detection threshold (δ) and for a
fixed µ in (37). Obviously, there is an optimum value of
δ such that Pd is maximized (for all the Pfa values). The
detection performance using the weights derived under the
attack − free scenario (i.e., αi = α
AF
i , see (31)) in (10)
is also plotted. This corresponds to the case when no SNs
11
identification scheme is used (i.e., µi = 0 in (37)). Clearly,
by appropriately choosing the reliability detection threshold
(δ), the proposed identification scheme performance gain is
significant compared to that when no identification scheme is
used. Now, in Fig. 13 we show the same (but now for a fixed
reliability detection threshold (δ)) and by varying the weight
penalty parameter (µ). Clearly, there does exist an optimum
value of µ that maximizes the ROC performance. Furthermore,
the performance improvement parametrized on µ is shown to
be significant for Pfa ≥ 0.1.
C. Detection Performance Comparison
We now compare the system detection performance of the
proposed strategy with the existing schemes.
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Fig. 14. Probability of detection (Pd) versus probability of false alarm (Pfa),
parametrized on K, δ and µ, with M = 40, N = 20, β = 0.25 (unless
otherwise stated), and P flip
C
= 1.
In Fig. 14, selecting some optimum value for δ and µ (more
precisely, δ = 0.009 and varying µ), we now compare our
proposed strategy with the existing ones such as an equal
combining scheme, the proposed scheme in [26] and the
proposed scheme in [12] (i.e., with αi = α
AF
i in (10)) derived
under the attack − free scenario. We can observe that the
performance of the proposed approach improves up to µ = 10
whereas after that a performance degradation is noticed. Also,
we can observe that by further increasing the time window
length K, it is possible to further improve the detection
performance. However, a careful selection of K should be
made in practice as increasing the value of K introduces a
delay to the FC decision making process. Clearly, the proposed
scheme has a significant detection performance improvement
compared to the case where no identification scheme is applied
and also outperforms the existing strategy [12] and [26].
In Fig. 15, we report the ROC for the two different schemes
(i.e., the one derived under an attack − free scenario and
the proposed one in this paper) parametrized on the fraction
of compromised SNs (β) and flipping probability (P flipC )
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Fig. 15. Probability of detection (Pd) versus probability of false alarm (Pfa),
parametrized on β, µ, and P flip
C
, with M = 40, N = 20, K = 5, and
δ = 0.009.
parameters. As expected (refer to (25)), the worst detection
performance is observed for the case when β = 0.5 and
P flipC = 1 as this is the case where the attacker causes the
maximum possible FC degradation. Clearly, for a fixed β (i.e.,
β = 0.5), the detection performance improves as the flipping
probability decreases. A significant improvement is observed
in particular for high probability of false alarm (Pfa) values.
Now, for low probability of false alarm (Pfa) (e.g., choosing
β = 0.25 and P flipC = 0.2), the proposed scheme significantly
outperforms the case when no identification scheme is applied
(i.e., αi = α
AF
i in (10)) while for high Pfa its performance
approaches the effective upper bound (i.e., when optimum
weights in (21) are used and perfect SNs identification is
assumed). Similarly, for e.g., β = 0.25 and β = 0.5 (for (fixed)
P flipC = 0.8), the proposed approach possesses a remarkable
detection performance gain compared to that of where no
identification scheme is applied.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered some of the key issues
related to under−attack WSNs. We have extended the results
presented in our previous work [33] by considering a more re-
alistic scenario where perfect knowledge of the true hypothesis
is not required by the attacker. Optimal strategies from the
FC’s and the attacker’s perspective have been characterized
and some bounds have been derived.
We also proposed a new reliability metric and based on
this, a reliability-based scheme was presented to identify the
compromised SNs in the network and to control their contri-
butions towards the FC’s final decision. This new approach
decreases the weights of the compromised SNs proportional
to the reputation metric whereas the existing schemes totally
exclude the compromised SNs (i.e., a zero weight is assigned)
from the fusion process. Simulation results have shown that
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the proposed approach significantly outperforms, in terms of
detection performance improvement, the existing FC rules and
the compromised SNs identification schemes.
While this work and the other related publications assume
that during the SNs identification stage, the attackers’ param-
eters (i.e., β and P flipC ) are fixed (i.e., not dynamic), there
are interesting questions as to how the dynamic attackers’
parameters will affect the network and how well the existing
schemes can isolate the compromised SNs in the network. In
this case, the dynamic optimum FC rules and the dynamic
attacker strategies will be of particular interest and will be
considered and investigated in future work in order to cope
with such dynamic scenarios.
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